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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we examine factors influencing the choice between tracking stocks and 
minority carve-outs and their performances. We expand the research in this field by 
incorporating a factor that was largely ignored in extant literature: managerial entrenchment. 
We find that the following firms have a greater tendency to choose tracking stocks over 
carve-outs: firms with a tendency to increase executive pays--especially those in the form of 
subsidiary stocks, firms that are more tightly controlled by their executives, and firms with 
greater financial strength prior to restructuring.  The former two are consistent with our 
conjecture that managerial entrenchment plays a role in the choice between tracking stocks 
and carve-outs. The latter result is consistent with our other hypothesis that prior financial 
strength influences the decision. Equally important findings are that both are characterized by 
poor long-term performances and that tracking stocks’ performances are on average inferior 
to those of carve-outs. Evidence suggests that these sub-par performances can be partially 
attributable to managerial entrenchment.  
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EXAMINING THE CHOICE BETWEEN TRACKING STOCKS AND 
MINORITY CARVE-OUTS AND THEIR RELATIVE PERORMANCES  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Minority carve-outs and tracking stocks are two very similar forms of corporate 
restructure: Both involve a separation of a subsidiary from the parent while the parent 
firm maintains the majority control. This study examines factors influencing the tradeoff 
and performances of the two restructuring methods, with a particular emphasis on agency 
conflicts, since the two methods primarily differ in the degree of shareholder protection. 
Equity carve-out is a public offering of shares of a formerly non-publicly traded 
subsidiary; the word “minority” here refers to the case where a parent sold only a 
minority interest, thus maintaining a majority control of the subsidiary after the 
restructure. Shareholders in the new firm have the right to elect a separate board of 
directors, the right to vote on matters of significant importance, and a claim on the carve-
out unit’s net assets. In contrast, tracking stock or targeted stock is a class of a company’s 
common stock created to track the performance of a particular business unit. Tracking 
stock does not represent direct ownership in the targeted business, but rather an 
ownership interest in the entire company (parent and subsidiary). The shares are typically 
distributed to current shareholders on a pro-rata basis or, less frequently, sold through an 
initial public offering. Unlike an equity carve-out, a tracking stock does not create a new 
legal entity. Tacking stock shareholders do not have a claim on the assets of the 
subsid iary. The business represented by the tracking stock remains a part of the 
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consolidated entity and shares a common board of shareholders. In contrast, carve-out 
parent executives rarely serve on the subsidiary’s board (Schipper and Smith (1986)).  
The above discussions suggest that the primary difference between tracking stock and 
carve-out is in the legal forms of the two organizational structures and the rights afforded 
to their shareholders.  
Executives of firms undergoing a tracking stock arguably have relatively more 
discretion on important matters. For example, some tracking stocks were cancelled and 
merged back into parent firms, while performing the same task for a carve-out would 
probably involve substantially higher costs and additional complications. The greater 
discretionary power associated with the parent of a tracking stock subsidiary is also 
manifested in its managers receiving bigger compensation than the managers of a curve -
out parent. Byrne (2002) states that “What few realized in the late 1990s, when many 
tracking stocks were issued, was that the stocks also could result in unusual windfalls for 
executives who, in effect, double up their options even though their jobs didn’t 
substantially change.” He uses an example of Sprint, who issued two tracking stocks in 
1998: PCS and FON. “… in the three years since the Sprint recap, seven of the 
company’s top executives have realized gains of $185 million on PCS stock options 
alone.” Additionally, Sprint’s tracking stock structure contributed to the failed attempt of 
MCI Worldcom to acquire Sprint PCS; this is because Sprint’s parent approval, not 
PCS’s, was required (Harris (1999)).  
The major hypothesis that we present and test in this paper is that the greater self-
serving managerial tendency is why some firms choose tracking stock over curve-out 
alternative of restructuring. In so doing, we also examine the long-term stock as well as 
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operating performance of parents that resort to these two types of restructuring methods. 
Agency problems are mentio ned in Hass (1996) and Harper and Madura (2002), but 
extant literature is silent on its effects on the choice and performance of tracking stocks 
versus carve-outs. 
There are quite a few studies on tracking stocks or carve-outs, and even more on 
spin-offs that represent complete separation of parent and subsidiary. However, only 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2001) and Boone, Haushalter and Mikkleson (2003) jointly 
examine tracking stocks and carve-outs. The  primary findings of both papers are that, for 
both tracking stocks and carve-outs, short-term stock price reactions are positive but 
long-term stock and operating performances are negative. Both also report that parent and 
subsidiary are more related (i.e., in similar line of business) in tracking stock issues than 
in carve-outs. Beyond this finding, the tradeoffs between the two are not clear.  
To better identify the potential determinants involved in the tradeoff, we 
concentrate on “minority” carve-outs that are closer to tracking stocks. The similarity of 
the two allows us to isolate the determining factors and provides a cleaner comparison. 
More specifically, literature generally views carve-outs and tracking stocks as having the 
benefits of reduction of information asymmetry, alignment of managers’ and 
shareholders’ interests, increased focus, and increased probability of becoming takeover 
target. The latter two are not applicable to tacking stocks and minority carve-outs, since 
executives remain virtually the same and the parent retains control of the subsidiary.   
Extant studies mostly focus on the benefits of carve-outs and tracking stocks. 
However, if we ignore the potential costs, endless separations of firms’ assets and 
divisions would have been observed. Our study contributes by explicitly considering a 
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cost that has been largely ignored in previous studies: managerial entrenchment. We also 
consider financial strength (access to financial markets) as one of the determining factors 
for the long-term performance in restructuring activities. 
Empirical results here provide some support for managerial entrenchment being a 
factor in the choice and relative performance of tracking stocks and crave-outs. Of 
particular statistical significance is the extra compensation parent executives receive from 
subsidiaries. Perhaps these findings explain why new tracking stock issues have been 
largely absent in recent years.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a survey of 
literature. Section three discusses the data and sample. Our hypotheses and research 
methodology are described in Section four, Section five reports results, while Section six 
concludes. 
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
Literature generally views that tracking stocks and carve-outs are motivated by 
the following considerations: better accountability and incentive for subsidiary’s 
managers, the ability of firms to time the issues in hot markets, reduction of information 
asymmetry, increased focus, and increased probability of becoming a takeover target. 
(See for instance Boone, Haushalter, and Mikkelson (2003).) These motives can also 
apply to spin-offs. However, synergies resulting from internal capital market, economies 
of scale, coinsurance effect of diversification, and taxes could be lost in spin-offs. 
Nevertheless, support for tracking stock or carve-out as a way to preserve synergy is 
mixed. For example, D’Souza and Jacob (2000) find that tracking stock issues have 
smaller tax- loss, compared to spin-offs. On the other hand, Billet and Mauer (2000) do 
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not find tax as a major factor. Rather, they suggest that internal capital market is an 
important concern: firms with more efficient internal capital utilization perform better 
within tracking stock issues. Both Chemmanur and Paeglis (2001) and Boone, Haushalter 
and Mikkelson (2003) find evidence that subsidiary is more related to parent in the case 
of tracking stocks than in carve-outs. We feel that if divisions are in similar line of 
business, the most likely type of synergy would be economies of scale. Therefore, their 
results could suggest that preservation of synergy from economies of scale is an 
important consideration in tracking stock. In summary, firms that conduct tracking stocks 
and carve-outs supposedly are those who want to preserve their synergies while reaping 
the benefits, and the sources of synergies and benefits are many.  Other than the potential 
loss of synergy, however, there are little discussions on costs of tracking stocks and 
carve-outs. 
One such cost is agency conflict, which is suggested by Hass (1996) and Harper 
and Madura (2002). The latter performs an empirical testing of the role of agency 
conflicts. They find some results consistent with the existence of agency considerations. 
For example, short-term stock price reaction to tracking stock issuance is greater when 
the parent’s debt ratio is low and when the parent’s prior stock performance is poor. 
Because firms with low debt ratio and inferior stock performance are likely those with 
considerable agency problems, the results are interpreted as consistent with a reduction in 
agency problem. Nevertheless, they document negative long-term performances. 
Consequently, they conclude “…it appears that while tracking stock may be created to 
reduce agency costs, it does not achieve its objective in the long run. In fact, additional 
agency problems outweigh any gains achieved through additional monitoring.” They 
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further point out that additional agency problems probably are inter-firm wealth transfers 
resulting from misallocation of resources or mis-pricing of IPO. Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2001) also find negative long-term returns and make a similar point: “…firms issuing 
tracking stock are able to eliminate fewer inefficiencies as a result of restructuring, and 
may to some extent even create new ones.” Here we contribute by comparing two similar 
activities that differ primarily in the degree of managerial discretion and entrenchment, 
thus providing more insight on the effects of agency conflicts. 
An intriguing theory by Gigler and Hemmer (2002) indicates another agency cost. 
In their model, the market price for a subsidiary provides additional information to 
managers concerning future possible wages, who would then choose their subsequent 
actions to maximize their own interests and unwilling to make long-term commitment. 
Stated differently, having additional subsidiary information produces an adverse 
incentive effect that may hurt shareholders. In their model, the creation of a subsidiary 
would be beneficial only if optimal contracts for divisions differ considerably. Therefore, 
they hypothesize that separation only makes sense for divisions that are sufficiently 
different in terms of optimal compensation contracts. Interestingly, their model seems to 
produce a prediction on business relatedness that is opposite to existing empirical finding. 
Their model suggests a subsidiary should be created only when the underlying businesses 
of the parent and the subsidiary are considerably different, while empirical studies 
reviewed above imply that subsidiaries are often closely related to parents. Their theory is 
different from our focus on managerial entrenchment in that they assume complete 
contracting while we do not.  
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Many studies document a positive short-term stock reaction to the announcement 
of issuing tracking stock, including Logue, Seward, and Walsh (1996), Billet and Mauer 
(2000), Zuta (2000), D’Souza and Jacob (2000), Elder and Westra (2000), Chemmanur 
and Paeglis (2001), and Harper and Madura (2002). Positive stock returns for parent 
firms are also found in announcements of equity carve-outs (e.g., Schipper and Smith, 
(1986); Anslinger, Carey and Gagnon (1997); Allen and McConnell (1998); Vijh (2002); 
and Madura and Nixon (2002)). Although evidence overwhelmingly indicates a short-
term gain, reasons for the gain are not clear. If timing and information asymmetry are 
critical factors, firms should sell subsidiary stocks when they are overvalued, implying 
that the larger the relative size of subsidiary, the lower the abnormal return (Nanda 
(1991)).  However, Vijh (2002) finds that, fo r carve-outs, abnormal returns are higher the 
size of subsidiary relative to the parent. Billett and Vijh (2004) find no significant 
reduction in information asymmetry, as measured by earnings forecast error. Elder, Jain, 
and Kim (2005) in fact show an increase in the information asymmetry component of the 
bid-ask spread following tracking stock announcements. On the other hand, Zuta (2000), 
Gilson, Healy, Noe and Palepu (2001) and Chemmanur and Paeglis (2001) document an 
increase in the number of analysts following tracking stocks and carve-outs.  
Our study focuses more on potential agency conflicts, which are better captured in 
the long run. There are relatively fewer papers that examine long-term performances. 
Harper and Madura (2002), Billett and Vijh (2004) and Clayton and Qian (2004) find that 
the parents of tracking stock firms are negative or neutral performers in the long term. 
Michaely and Shaw (1995) and Madura and Nixon (2002) show that carve-out parents 
substantially under-perform the market subsequent to carve-outs. The latter study further 
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indicates that the long-term performance of parents is poorer for those that were 
distressed prior to carve-outs, suggesting that carve-outs do not alleviate agency 
problems. Regarding subsidiary stocks, Vijh (1999) and Powers (2003) report that carve -
out subsidiaries do not demonstrate significant positive or negative long-run return.  
Powers (2003) shows a negative relationship between long-term abnormal return and 
percentage of shares sold, consistent with the notion that firms can time the market – 
selling shares when they are overvalued. 
As mentioned earlier, only two studies, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2001) and 
Boone, Haushalter and Mikkelson (2003), directly compare tracking stocks and carve -
outs. Both find a significant negative long-term performance, measured either in terms of 
stock returns or operating returns (changes in returns on assets). Boone, Haushalter and 
Mikkelson (2003) document a negative relationship between long-term returns and 
fractions of shares held by parents, suggesting that tight control by parent hurt 
shareholders. Although they do not offer an explicit explanation for this result, it is 
plausible that tight control by the parent creates additional agency problems.  
Allen and McConnell (1998) present a theory that explicitly recognizes the 
important role of managerial discretion. They hypothesize that managers are reluctant to 
give up control unless it is necessary and that more financially constrained parents likely 
choose carve-out over spin-off. Consistent with the theory, carve-out firms tend to have 
prior poor performance and high debt. Their theory is extended here to the choice 
between tracking stocks and carve -outs. Because only a small fraction of tracking stocks 
is issued through IPO, we hypothesize that the carve-out parents are in a more immediate 
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need for cash and their financial conditions are poorer than the tracking stock 
counterparts. 
III.  DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Equity carve-outs have been a popular form of corporate restructuring, with 
average annual volume of more than $20 billion between 1995 and 2000 (Annema, 
Fallon and Goedhart, 2001). On the other hand, tracking stock issues vary considerably 
over time. For instance, seventeen announcements of tracking stock struc ture were made 
in 1999, while eight companies withdrew in 2000. For instance, Pittston adopted tracking 
stock in 1993 but eliminated it in 2000. After the dot-com bubble, tracking stock issues 
have been absent. Nevertheless, in 2001, Worldcom adopted the tracking stock structure 
intended to reflect the separate performances of its Worldcom and MCI businesses. 
Our sample covers carve-outs and tracking stocks, starting from 1991 because all 
but two tracking stocks were created after 1990.1  The initial samples of 237 equity carve-
outs and 52 tracking stocks announcements between 1991 and 2001 are derived from 
SDC database and cross-checked with Lexis/Nexis. For the carve-out sample, we include 
only minority carve-outs in which parents maintain over 50% of the ownership in 
restructured units. Thus, “carve-outs” refer to minority crave-outs hereinafter. For 
companies that conducted repeated carve-outs, we keep only the first one. The sample 
firm also needs to be listed in Standard and Poor’s Compustat and Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) to ensure that financial statements data, executive compensation, 
and stock return data are available for further analysis. These screening procedures 
produce a carve-out sample of 57 firms. For the tracking stock sample, 22 
announcements never materialized. Of the remaining 30, four were excluded for their 
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foreign origins. Consequently, the tracking stock sample consists of 26 firms. Table 1 
reports the frequency of announcements across years. Most of the tracking stocks in the 
sample were created in 1999, while 1996 is the year in which most minority carve -outs 
occurred. 
As one of the key hypotheses is to test whether managerial self-serving behavior 
plays a role in the restructuring decisions, we investigate the change in executive 
compensation after restructuring. We collected managerial compensation data from proxy 
statements one year before the restructuring and one year after. Other corporate 
governance variables such as insider holdings, institutional holdings, and board 
composition are obtained from the Compact Disclosure CD-ROM. We also extract 
accounting and operating performance data and earning forecast errors from 
COMPUSTAT. 
IV. HYPOTHESES, METHODOLGY AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Major Hypotheses  
Our main hypothesis is that because tracking stocks are subject to a greater degree 
of managerial discretion and control, they are more vulnerable to managerial self-serving 
behavior, compared to carve-outs. The implications are that, relative to carve-outs, 1) 
tracking stocks are more likely to be chosen by entrenched managers; 2) tracking stocks’ 
long-term performances are likely to be inferior; 3) a tracking stock’s long-term 
performance is worse for firms occupied by entrenched managers. We also include 
financial strength as a potential factor in the choice and performance of tracking stock 
and carve-outs. We hypothesize that tracking stock parents are characterized by greater 
                                                                                                                                            
1 The first tracking stock issues occurred in 1984 by General Motors. 
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financial strength prior to announcements. More detailed descriptions of our hypotheses 
are presented as we discuss the variables. 
Choice between Tacking Stocks and Carve-outs 
We employ a logistic regression analysis to test our hypothesis regarding how 
firms choose between minority curve-outs and tracking stock. The dependent variable in 
this regression is a dummy, (TRACK = 1 for tracking stocks and 0 for carve-outs).  For 
the purpose of exposition, we classify independent variables into two groups:  managerial 
entrenchment variables and other variables. 
Managerial Entrenchment Variables 
To measure managerial discretion and self- serving tendencies, we investigate 
changes in managerial compensations, institutional and insider holdings, and board size. 
Because parent’s executives, not subsidiary’s, are the ones who supposedly initiate 
restructuring, we utilize only parent company’s data and parent executive compensations. 
The proxy statements list equity-related compensations (i.e., stocks and options) 
separately for the parent and subsidiary, but not so for cash compensations. Thus, our 
data source allows us to calculate three components of compensations, as follows. CASH 
is the change  (the year after minus the year before restructure) in cash-related 
compensation surrounding restructuring, divided by total compensation. Total 
compensation is defined as the sum of cash compensation, stock awards, long-term 
investment pool, and stock options paid to the top five executives. Shareholdings are 
measured in terms of dollar amount of shares distributed to the top five executives. Stock 
options are estimated as the present value of options based on the Black-Scholes Option 
Pricing Model at the time of grant. The second component of executive compensation, 
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PARENT_STOCK, is the change in equity-related compensation of the parent stock, also 
scaled by total compensation. Finally, SUB_STOCK is the change in equity-related 
compensations of the subsidiary stock (paid to parent executives). It is, again, divided by 
total compensation. We hypothesize that the portion of executive compensation derived 
from the restructured unit is greater for tracking stocks than for carve-outs. Other 
corporate governance measures are insider holdings, institutional holdings, and board size. 
INSIDER, insider ownership, is the percentage ownership of officers and directors of the 
parent. INSTITUTION, institutional ownership, indicates the percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors. BOARD_SIZE, is a proxy for the board effectiveness, 
measured by the number of executives on the parent’s board. There are reasons to believe 
that insiders and institutional investors are more capable monitors of firms than 
individual investors, for they typically have substantial holdings and have better access to 
information. Thus, the lower the insider and institutional ownership of a parent firm, the  
less likely the parent firm will engage in carve-outs, which involve initial public offerings 
(IPO) thus stronger disclosure requirement. The board size may reflect the degree of 
control that the board members have on the parent. Jensen (1993) suggests that the 
effectiveness of the board is inversely related to the number of directors as he contends 
that smaller boards tend to be more efficient. In sum, if managerial entrenchment plays a 
critical role in the restructuring decision, then we expect to see lower insider holdings, 
lower monitoring role of the institutional investors, and a larger board of directors in 
tracking stock structure than for carve-out. Data for all variables in this study represent 
the most recent data before restructuring. 
Other variables 
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Another new hypothesis in this study is that the carve-out parents are in inferio r 
financial conditions than tracking stocks’. The proxy of financial strength and liquidity of 
a firm is the interest coverage ratio (INT_COV). We feel that this measure is more 
appropriate than the debt ratio, because interest coverage simultaneously incorporates 
debt payments as well as earnings power.  
While our focus is in potential agency conflicts, we also include factors examined 
in other studies, as follows. A measure of similarity of parent and subsidiary’s businesses 
is notated as RELATEDNESS, the number of the first digits of four-digit SIC codes that 
are the same for the parent and subsidiary. As an example, if the four-digit SIC codes of 
the parent are exactly the same as those of the restructured unit, a value of 4 is given. If 
first three SIC codes are the same, 3 is given, and vice versa. This metric follows that of 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2001). With respect to information asymmetry, we use the 
absolute difference between latest actual quarter earning per share and average earnings 
estimate, divided by the latest actual earnings per share, denoted as INF_ASY 
(Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999)). A larger percentage indicates higher level of 
information asymmetry between investors and managers. If restructuring reduces 
information asymmetry, we expect a positive relationship between pre-restructure 
INF_ASY and firm performances after restructuring. Fama and French (1992) find that 
firm size (FIRM_SIZE) and market to book ratio (MKT/BOOK) are important 
determinants of stock returns. Consequently, these two variables are included in the 
regression analyses. 
Analysis of long-term performances 
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To see if the above factors affect long-term performance, we apply OLS 
regression approach to two equations, with market performance being the dependable 
variable in one and operating performance in the other. We measure long-term market 
performance by three-year buy-and-hold stock return. To adjust the stock performance of 
restructuring parents with that of industry peers, we obtain a matching firm for each 
restructuring parent with the same SIC code and the closest asset size. The industry-peer-
adjusted return is calculated as the return of the restructuring firm minus that of the 
matching firm. The operating performance is measured, following Boone, Haushalter and 
Mikkelson (2003), by computing changes in return on assets (ROA). 
The independent variables are the same as those in logistic regression. 
Additionally, we have argued that tracking stocks are more likely to be affected by 
managerial self- interest. Therefore, we allow the coefficients of corporate control 
variables to vary between the two restructuring methods. Specifically, we pool the data of 
tracking stocks and carve-outs in one regression, but include several interaction terms: 
TRACK * corporate control variable; as defined earlier, TRACK equals 1 for the tracking 
group and 0 for the carve-out.  
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 summarizes the sample and reports the mean, median, and differences in 
mean and median between the tracking stock and the carve-out groups. The mean change 
in total compensation (from one year before restructuring to one year after), TOTAL, is 
121% for tracking stocks, much higher than that of the carve-out sample, the average for 
which is only 66%. Similarly, the median percentage changes in compensations are 59% 
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and 30% for the tracking stock group and the carve -out group, respectively. Both the 
mean and the median differences between the two groups are significant at the 10% level.  
The results are similar for parent stock compensations (PARENT_STOCK) and 
subsidiary stock (SUB_STOCK): they are greater for tracking stocks than carve -outs. 
Cash compensations, however, are insignificantly higher for carve-outs.  These initial 
results are mostly consistent with our hypothesis that tracking stock managers have 
greater hold of their firms and indulge themselves with higher pays. Since parent 
executives’ jobs remain virtually the same after restructuring, it can be argued that 
compensation in the form of subsidiary stock is unnecessary. Table 2, however, shows 
that the difference in SUB_STOCK between tracking stocks and curve-outs is strikingly 
large.  Further details (not shown in the table) indicate that 35% of the tracking stock 
firms’ executives receive subsidiary stocks, while only 9% of the carve-out firms having 
directors on the boards of both the parent and the subsidiary and receive subsidiary stocks. 
Although 35% is not large in absolute sense, it is substantial given the arguably needless 
nature of subsidiary stock compensations. 
Other managerial factors also indicate some differences between the two samples. 
The tracking stock parents have, on average, a slightly larger board of 11 executives, 
compared to that of equity carve-out firms of 10. The difference, however, is not 
significant. The average insider holdings and institutional holdings for the tracking stock 
sample are both lower than those of the carve-out sample, confirming our conjecture that 
tracking stocks are more tightly controlled by managers. The mean difference in insider 
holdings between the two groups is significant at the 10% level.  
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The difference in information asymmetry measure, INF_ASY, is large. The 
average forecast error for the tracking stock group is 0.35, whereas that of the carve-out 
sample is 0.21. On the other hand, the median is greater for the carve-out sample. 
Consistent with previous research, we find that tracking stock parents are more related to 
their restructured subsidiaries than carve-out parents. The average value of 
RELATEDNESS for the tracking stock sample is 2.8 and the median is 3.0, compared to 
1.5 and 1.0 of the  carve-out sample. Differences in both the mean and the median 
between the two groups are significant at the 10% level.  
Table 2 also shows that parents of tracking stocks are in better financial shape 
than those of the carve-out group. Both mean and median interest coverage, INT_COV, 
are significantly higher for the tracking stock group than the carve-out group. Parents of 
tracking stock group have higher (although not statistically significant) market-to-book 
ratio s than the carve-out group. In terms of profitability (ROA), the carve-out group 
underperforms the tracking stock sample at a statistically significant level. 2   Taken 
together, it appears that need for external capital (IPOs) by curve -out parents is driven not 
by higher growth potential but lower profitability. Finally, measured either by book value 
(TOTAL_ASSETS) or market value (FIRM_SIZE), tracking stock parents are on average 
larger in sizes. 
Logistic regression analysis of the choice between tracking stock and carve -out  
To investigate the factors influencing firms’ choice between tracking stocks and 
carve-outs, we perform a logistic regression, with TRACK as the dependent variable. 
                                                
2 The large difference between mean and median is mainly due to the few firms such as Sepracor Inc. that 
had a return on assets of -44.787%. 
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This variable takes on the value of one for tracking stocks and zero for carve -outs. The 
results are displayed in Table 3.   
Table 3 Model (1) presents evidence that total compensations and the probability 
of choosing tracking stock are positively correlated. Model (2) includes other relevant 
variables and the significant coefficients imply the following: firms with greater interest 
coverage prior to announcements and firms whose subsid iaries are more related to 
parents are more likely to choose tracking stocks. The former is a new result that is 
consistent with our hypothesis that liquidity plays a role in the restructuring decision; the 
latter finding is in agreement with that of previous studies. The result also implies that 
total compensation is not significantly, though still positively, associated with the 
propensity to issue tracking stocks. It is likely that more insights can be gained by 
breaking down stock compensations into parent and subsidiary stocks. Due to data 
limitation however, we cannot do the same breakdown for cash compensations. The 
results in Model (3) indicate that executives receiving less cash compensations but more 
subsidiary stocks are more likely to opt for tracking stocks. Because subsidiary stock 
compensation is arguably unjustified for parent executives, this piece of evidence is 
consistent with our hypothesis that tracking stock sample firms are subject to a greater 
degree of managerial entrenchment. The fact that tracking stock executives being 
associated with less cash payments appears to be contrary to our hypothesis, but it should 
be kept in mind that the cash compensation here include those paid by parent and 
subsidiary, obscuring the real incentive effects of these payments. The coefficient of 
INF_ASY, the information asymmetry measure, is significantly positive, suggesting that 
the parents with relatively greater information asymmetry before restructuring prefer to 
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issue tracking stocks. This result is hard to be explained by minimization of information 
asymmetry, since carve-outs with their typically stronger disclosure requirements should 
be chosen if reducing information asymmetry is the goal. Alternatively, if firms with 
greater information asymmetry are also those with stronger degree of managerial 
entrenchment, the evidence here could be interpreted as supportive for our hypothesis. 
More specifically, we argue that firms subject to a greater degree of managerial 
entrenchment would probably be more resistant to disclosing all relevant information, 
thus choosing the less-regulated alternative—tracking stock.  
Analysis of long-term performances  
Table 4 compares buy-and-hold stock returns and peer-adjusted returns of parents 
who engage in tracking stocks and those carve out subsidiaries. The return is computed 
for a holding period of three years after restructuring, and for comparison purpose, we 
also report returns three years prior. Prior to restructuring, both groups’ performances are 
indistinguishable from their peers, suggesting that either timing is not an important 
concern or that firms’ ability to time the issues is, on average, not superior. Consistent 
with Chemmanur and Paeglis (2001) and Billett and Vijh (2004), post-restructuring 
performances of tracking stock and carve-out parents on average are lower than those of 
industry peers. The average adjusted three-year return of tracking stock parents is -0.494 
and is statistically significant. In contrast, carve-out parents ’ underperformances are 
insignificant. Thus, the evidence provides support for our hypothesis that tracking stocks’ 
performances are likely to be lower due to their potentially greater agency conflicts. 
However, it should be noted that the insignificance performance for carve-outs is due to 
large deviations in performances. Given that medians are probably more robust statistics 
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in the presence of extreme values and that both sets of firms’ median performances are 
insignificantly different from their peers, the evidence support ing our hypothesis is not 
overwhelming. The table also compares the operating performance, as measured by 
changes in ROA, of the two groups. Both experience a decline in return on assets three 
years after restructuring. This is consistent with the results in Boone, Haushalter and 
Mikkelson (2003) and Power (2003), As in stock performances, the mean operating 
performance is significantly lower than peers for tracking stocks, but insignificantly so 
for carve-outs. This reinforces our conclusion that tracking stocks are on average poorer 
performers. In summary, sub-par long-term performances are evident for carve-outs and 
especially for tracking stocks 3.  
Table 5 reports the analysis of the determinants of three-year stock and operating 
performances of the pooled sample. Here we include TRACK (=1 for tracking stocks) as 
an independent variable, the coefficient of which would indicate the difference in 
performances between tracking stocks and carve -outs, after controlling for other known 
factors. Moreover, we include interaction variables (TRACK * corporate control variable) 
to investigate the differential effects of corporate control on restructuring methods. 
We first focus on the determinants of stock performance, given in the first two 
regressions in Table 5.  It is noteworthy that tracking stock’ performances tend to be 
positively linked to parent stock compensations but negatively related to pay in the form 
of subsidiary equity. This indicates that compensations in the form of subsidiary stock 
                                                
3 To check for the robustness of the results, we separate firms into a group that parents owning over 80% of 
subsidiary and the other owning between 50% and 80% of the subsidiary (The financial statements of the 
parent and subsidiary are consolidated for tax purposes when the parent owns over 80% of the ownership). 
There is no significant difference in the long-term stock performa nce and the operating performance 
between the two subgroups. We also compare the performance of tracking stocks involving IPOs and those 
without. The results are also qualitatively the same. 
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present conflicts and the result here in fact shows that this type of compensation is 
counter-productive for tracking stocks. Thus, the overall evidence regarding executive 
compensations point to the following: Tracking stocks tend to pay more in the form of 
subsidiary stock and this payment is on average associated with poor long-term 
performance, consistent with our hypothesis. While other measures for managerial 
entrenchment including institutional holdings and board size are insignificant, the 
coefficient of insider holdings is significantly negative and particularly so for tracking 
stocks, implying that insider s in these firms do not monitor the firms efficiently.  In 
addition, recall that Table 2 indicates lower insider holdings for tracking stocks. Combing 
that result with a negative insider effect on performance here, we conclude that for 
tracking stock firms, the interests of insiders of the parents are not well aligned with those 
of shareholders. The coefficient of INF_ASY is positive; this result is sensible based on 
the information asymmetry argument that firms with greater information asymmetry prior 
to restructuring are the ones that most likely benefit from such activities.  
The same regression is repeated on operating performance, measured by changes 
in ROA’s. The signs of the compensation variables are the same as those for stock 
performances. While the coefficient on subsidiary stock is insignificant, the significant 
negative coefficient on cash compensation still provides hint for the existence of agency 
problems affecting operating performances. Model (3) also shows that operating 
performance is statistically positively related to institutional holdings for carve-outs, but 
the relation is negative for tracking stocks (the coefficient on INSTITUTION minus that 
of INSTITUTION*TRACK equals -0.028). This implies that institutional investors’ 
monitoring activity is less likely to be productive for tracking stocks, a result consistent 
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with our case that the lack of shareholder protection in tracking stock structure presents 
problems in monitoring and produces inferior performances. However, Model (4), which 
does not decompose compensations, indicates that total compensations are negatively 
related to  operating performances  for carve-outs  but the relation is positive for tracking 
stocks. At first glance, the result for tracking stock does not appear to be consistent with 
our hypothesis. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that we do believe that 
compensation contracts, if properly constructed, could provide incentives for better 
performance, especially operating performance that is to a larger extent more controllable 
by managers than stock performance. Our point is that compensation contracts that are 
manipulated or influenced by self- serving managers likely destroy shareholders’ wealth. 
Therefore, we feel that analyses involving the decomposition of compensations are more 
informative and the results indeed show some patterns that cannot be explained by 
managers maximizing shareholders’ wealth.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we examine factors influencing the choice between tracking stocks 
and minority carve-outs and their performances. We expand the research in this field by 
incorporating a factor that was largely ignored in extant literature: managerial 
entrenchment. We find that  the following firms have a greater tendency to choose 
tracking stocks over carve-outs: firms with a tendency to increase executive pays--
especially those in the form of subsidiary stocks, firms that are more tightly controlled by 
managers, and firms with greater financial strength prior to restructuring.  The former 
two are consistent with our conjecture that managerial entrenchment plays a role in the 
choice between tracking stocks and carve-outs. The latter result is consistent with our  
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other hypothesis that prior financial strength influences the decision. Equally important 
findings are that both are characterized by poor long-term performances and that tracking 
stocks’ performances are on average inferior to those of carve -outs. Evidence suggests 
that these sub-par performances can be partially attributable to managerial entrenchment. 
We argue that the control mechanism of the tracking stock structure-- with the same 
board of directors serving both the parent and the subsidiary-- creates conflicts of 
interests. Payments of subsidiary stock to parent executives especially do not make sense, 
yet they are fairly common among tracking stocks. While new tracking stock issues are 
rare in recent years, the evidence could help to design new restructuring methods and 
new security designs.  
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Table 1 
 
The Number of Tracking Stocks and Minority Equity Carve -outs from 1991 to 2001 
 
 
Year   Tracking Stock  Minority carve-outs 
 
1991 1 3 
1992 1 4 
1993 2 7 
1994 1 5 
1995 2 2 
1996 2 9 
1997 2 4 
1998 2 4 
1999 7 4 
2000 3    8 
2001 3 7 
 
 
Total         26    57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Tracking Stock and Carve-Out Samples 
 
The variable TOTAL is the percentage change in total compensation; CASH is the percentage change in cash 
compensation; PARENT_STOCK is the percentage change in parent stock compensation; SUB_STOCK is the 
percentage change in subsidiary stock compensation; INSIDER is the insider holdings; INSTITUTION is the 
institutional holdings; BOARD_SIZE is the board size; INT_COV is the interest coverage ratio, before tax; 
RELATEDNESS is the measure of relatedness; INF_ASY is the information asymmetry measure; MKT/BOOK is the 
price-to-book ratio; ROA is the return on assets; and TOTAL_ASSETS and FIRM_SIZE are the book value and 
market value of the parents (in $1,000). The t-test and Mann-Whitney are used to test the significance of mean and 
median differences. The signs ***, **, * represent significance at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sample 
size is 26 for the tracking group and 57 for the carve-out group. 
 
 Tracking Stock Sample Carve-Out Sample  
 N=26    N=57 
Variables  Mean            Median              Mean            Median Mean Median 
                 Difference  
    
TOTAL    1.21  0.59  0.66  0.30 0.55*      0.29* 
 
CASH   0.17  0.12  0.33  0.18 -0.16       -0.06 
 
PARENT_STOCK 1.04  0.51  0.34  0.01  0.70**       0.50** 
 
SUB_STOCK  0.17  0.10  0.01  0 0.16***       0.10*** 
 
INSIDER (in %)  4.39  0.50  11.70  1.55 -7.31*          -1.05 
 
INSTITUTION (%) 42.95  45.39  48.45  47.48 -5.50            -2.09 
 
BOARD_SIZE   11.30  11.50  9.86  10.00  1.44         1.50 
 
INT_COV  7.81  6.65  3.38  2.78   4.43*           3.87* 
 
RELATEDNESS  2.80  3.00  1.55  1.00        1.25***      2.00*** 
 
INF_ASY  0.35  0.10  0.21  0.15   0.14        -0.05 
 
ROA (in %)   3.44  4.40  -0.19  2.13   3.63*            2.27* 
 
MKT/BOOK   3.45  2.83  2.36  1.99   1.09             0.84 
 
TOTAL_ASSETS 21,067  5,604  23,992  2,553 -2,925       3,051 
 
FIRM_SIZE  56,533  10,188  40,032  5,336 16,501        4,852** 
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Table 3 
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Choice between Tracking Stock and Carve-Out 
In the three regression models, the dependent variable is TRACK = 1 for tracking stocks and zero for carve-outs. The 
independent variables are as follows.  TOTAL is the percentage change in total compensation; CASH is the percentage 
change in cash compensation; PARENT_STOCK is the percentage change in parent stock compensation; 
SUB_STOCK is the percentage change in subsidiary stock compensation; INSIDER is the insider holdings; 
INSTITUTION is the institutional holdings; BOARD_SIZE is the board size; INT_COV is the interest coverage ratio, 
before tax; RELATEDNESS is the measure of relatedness; INF_ASY is the information asymmetry measure; 
MKT/BOOK is the price-to-book ratio; ROA is the return on assets; and FIRM_SIZE is the market value of the parents 
(in $1,000). p-values are in parentheses. The signs ***, **, * represent significance at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Sample size is 83, consisting of 26 for the tracking group and 57 for the carve-out group. 
 
Dependent 
Variable   (1)   (2)   (3)   
 
Intercept    0.312   0.157   0.604   
    (.000)   (0.807)   (0.301) 
TOTAL    0.024*   0.029 
    (0.075)   (0.656) 
CASH           -0.495**  
          (0.013)   
PARENT_STOCK         0.046  
          (0.522)   
SUB_STOCK         0.535***  
          (0.006)  
INSIDER       -0.005   -0.008  
       (0.501)   (0.233)  
INSTITUTION      -0.002   -0.002  
       (0.506)   (0.529) 
BOARD_SIZE      0.023   0.005  
       (0.478)   (0.871)   
INT_COV      0.029*   0.031**  
       (0.085)   (0.048)  
RELATEDNESS      0.016*   0.060  
       (0.060)   (0.237)   
INF_ASY      0.006   0.010*  
       (0.285)   (0.069)   
ROA       -0.024   -0.034  
       (0.424)   (0.217)   
MKT/BOOK      0.030   0.017  
       (0.405)   (0.601)   
FIRM_SIZE      -0.091   -0.120  
       (0.453)   (0.263)  
  
Adjusted R2   0.030   0.245  0.429                  
F-Statistic   3.264*   2.071*   3.058**   
N (Sample Size)   83   83   83 
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Table 4 
A Comparison of Stock and Operating Performances of  
Tracking Stocks and Carve-Outs 
 
This table displays mean, standard deviation, and median of stock and operating returns. The signs ***, **, * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, based on t test for means and Mann-Whitney test for medians. 
Sample size is 26 for the trackin g group and 57 for the carve-out group. 
 
 
   Tracking Stock                               Carve-outs 
 
  Mean Standard Median  Mean      Standard Median  
                   Deviation       Deviation          
 
Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Stock Return: 
 
Before  1.144*** 1.889 0.051  1.071*** 1.547 0.692  
After  0.272 0.987 -0.151  0.027 2.233 -0.023  
 
Industry  Peer Adjusted Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Stock Return: 
 
Before  0.141 1.061 0.036  0.432 1.887 0.347  
After  -0.494** 0.988 -0.351  -0.556 2.935 -0.014  
 
Three-Year Average Operating Performance (ROA in %): 
 
Before  3.245*** 4.583 3.362  -0.896 12.059 2.498  
After  -1.285 12.578 1.464  -7.485*** 24.414 0.876          
 
Industry Peer Adjusted Three-Year Operating Performance (ROA in %): 
 
Before  -2.537 8.059 -0.333  1.594 22.876 -0.661  
After  -6.072***10.177 -4.079  -5.638 31.911 -1.845  
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Table 5 
Regression Analysis of Three-Year Stock and Operating Performances 
The stock performance is measured by three-year buy-and-hold stock return , and operating performance is 
measured by three-year average return on assets. p-values are in parentheses and ***, **, * represent significance 
at 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sample size is 83--26 for the tracking group and 57 for the carve-out group. 
 
Dependent Variable              Stock Performance          Operating Performance  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Intercept    4.195  5.506  -0.839  -10.567 
(0.082)  (0.034)  (0.940)  (0.376) 
TOTAL       -0.037    -3.062** 
       (0.899)    (0.042) 
TOTAL*TRACK     0.099    4.387* 
       (0.847)    (0.092) 
CASH     -1.875    -12.682*  
     (0.190)    (0.082)   
CASH* TRACK    -0.764    -8.359   
     (0.904)    (0.788)  
PARENT_STOCK   -0.115    1.046   
     (0.787)    (0.619)   
PARENT_STOCK * TRACK  2.239*    4.405   
     (0.077)    (0.454)   
SUB_STOCK    3.224*    6.588   
     (0.084)    (0.449)   
SUB_STOCK * TRACK   -6.851**    -9.129         
     (0.023)    (0.497)   
INSIDER    -0.072**  -0.050*  -0.098  -0.047 
     (0.014)  (0.065)  (0.451)  (0.705) 
INSIDER * TRACK   -0.600**  -0.124  -1.252  -0.301 
     (0.030)  (0.327)  (0.319)  (0.621) 
INSTITUTION    -0.009  -0.026  0.262**               0.278*** 
     (0.610)  (0.138)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
INSTITUTION * TRACK   0.007  0.016      -0.290**  -0.352** 
     (0.790)  (0.555)  (0.034)  (0.015) 
BOARD_SIZE    -0.062  -0.089  0.606  1.390** 
     (0.661)  (0.511)  (0.389)  (0.045) 
BOARD_SIZE * TRACK   0.662  0.264  2.245  -0.204 
     (0.119)  (0.292)  (0.269)  (0.865) 
INT_COV    0.025  0.023  -0.418  -0.529* 
     (0.639)  (0.683)  (0.126)  (0.070) 
RELATEDNESS     0.001  -0.460**  0.227  -0.099 
     (0.997)  (0.048)  (0.867)  (0.926) 
INF_ASY    0.124**  0.060*  0.395*  0.248 
     (0.011)  (0.077)  (0.076)  (0.127) 
MKT/BOOK     -0.074  -0.025  0.580  0.406 
     (0.617)  (0.870)  (0.427)  (0.579) 
FIRM_SIZE    -0.715  -0.542  -5.709**  -5.363**  
(0.157)  (0.258)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
OWNERSHIP_SOLD   0.188  -1.433  7.393  11.110 
     (0.954)  (0.633)  (0.648)  (0.449) 
TRACK     -7.276  -4.075  -12.330  15.315 
     (0.108)  (0.243)  (0.561)  (0.362) 
Adjusted R2    0.211  0.127             0.515  0.380 
F-Statistic    1.451  0.944 2.791**  2.310** 
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